Margaret Thatcher, the NUM, and the mysterious Mr Deverell

We have just put online a number of documents that offer us a glimpse into a rarely seen aspect of Margaret Thatcher’s prime ministership. These documents come from folder number 494 in the PREM19 series of Margaret Thatcher’s Prime Ministerial papers. Entitled ‘National Union of Mineworkers: National Miners Left Club’, the folder gives us an insight, albeit sketchy, into the secretive work of a little-known Cabinet Office unit. 

Two items from PREM19/494 are of particular interest. The first (see here) contains two documents. One appears to be a coversheet that would originally have been attached to another document, in this case a report numbered IAG(80)10. The coversheet states that owing to the ‘very sensitive nature’ of the document in question, ‘it must not be placed on a normal Departmental file’, but must instead be returned to the Cabinet Office once it has been read. It is presumably because these instructions were followed that the report is not present within PREM19/494. Nevertheless, an annotation on the coversheet (dated 12^th March 1980) gives us an idea of the report’s content. The note, signed by Clive Whitmore (MT’s Principal Private Secretary), is transcribed below:

Prime Minister
A revealing indication of Mr Vic Allen’s influence in NUM matters.
I think that we should ask whether there would be advantage in exposing the existence and activities of the Miners’ Left Club. Shall I seek Sir Robert Armstrong’s advice?

Under this note MT writes, 'Yes please'.

This annotation gives us an idea of the content of the missing report. Vic Allen was (and is) a left-wing academic who served as the official historian of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM). Avowedly pro-Soviet, in 1999 he was revealed to have passed information about the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) to the East German Secret Police (Stasi). Obviously, we cannot know exactly what the missing report ‘indicated’ about his ‘influence in NUM matters', but it clearly has something to do with the existence of ‘the Miners’ Left Club’. Another document from PREM19/494 helps us fill in some of the gaps here. In a minute addressed to Clive Whitmore, Cabinet Secretary Robert Armstrong refers to the work of ‘Communist Party activists’ within the Left Club, and a ‘sub-committee set up to plan and monitor Mr. Scargill’s campaign for the NUM Presidency’. (Scargill, of course, was elected President of the NUM the following year.) These fragments therefore collectively suggest that the missing report contained information regarding a left-wing group within the NUM that was working toward Scargill's election, that this group was linked to the Communist Party, and that Vic Allen held some degree of influence over this group.

How was this information obtained in the first place? Armstrong’s minute to Whitmore talks about the risk of ‘endangering sources’ by publicising the information, so it is natural to infer that a source or sources within the NUM were passing information out, and that this information was finding its way into government reports. Beyond this, however, we can only speculate, and speculating about such a controversial area of history is perhaps unwise. However, what we can do is return to the documents we have, and see what other hints we can glean from them. 

Let’s go back to our first item, the file containing the annotated coversheet for the missing report. Also contained in this file is a note from Whitmore to Armstrong dated 17^th March 1980, in which Whitmore does as he says he would, and seeks advice on ‘whether there would be advantage in exposing the existence and activities of the Miners’ Left Club’. Whitmore writes to Armstrong as follows:

The Prime Minister has seen the report in IAG(80)10 on the activities of the National Miners’ Left Club and she has asked whether this is not the kind of case where some publicity, arranged under Mr Deverell’s auspices, might be useful.

I should be glad to know what you think.

Who is this mysterious Mr Deverell? The aforementioned minute from Armstrong to Whitmore doesn’t help us much here, telling us only that Mr Deverell ‘has been examining the activities of the National Miners Left Club in the hope of finding a way of [publicising them] without endangering sources’. Nor can we find the answer by searching our own archive: the name 'Deverell' appears only in the two documents that we are currently looking at.

Fortunately, assistance can be found in the form of Christopher Andrew’s 2010 history of the Security Service, The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5. In Chapter 7, Andrew refers to MT's having held a meeting on the 21st October 1979 to establish a Cabinet Office unit that would 'use information from both open and secret sources to try to forestall industrial disruption’ (p.671). No record of this meeting exists in our archive, presumably because any such record (if it ever existed) was highly confidential and therefore did not find its way into the PREM19 series. Nevertheless, we can see from MT’s engagement diary that the meeting was held at Chequers at 3pm, and was attended by the Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington, Home Secretary Willie Whitelaw, Secretary of State for Industry Keith Joseph, outgoing Cabinet Secretary John Hunt, incoming Cabinet Secretary Robert Armstrong, and Clive Whitmore. 

Andrew goes on:

John Deverell, then considered one of the Service’s [i.e. MI5’s] younger high-fliers, was seconded to run the unit, which Service records suggest became a one-man band. Sir Robert Armstrong agreed with Deverell that they would ‘firmly eschew any thoughts of black propaganda’ as the risk would far outweigh the likely gains. Deverell was tasked instead with submitting proposals for countering specific cases of industrial subversion for approval by the Home Secretary and, if appropriate, the Prime Minister. [pp.671-2]

Andrew then gives an account of the unit’s ‘first successful ‘ploy’ in response to a strike-call by the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers (AUEW) at the government-owned British Leyland (BL) Longbridge plant’ (p.672). The strike-call was made in response to the firing by BL of Derek "Red Robbo" Robinson, a union shop steward and Communist Party member. The aim of Deverell's Cabinet Office unit was to undermine support for Robinson, and thereby to weaken support for strike action among trade union members, leaders, and the wider public.

The ‘ploy’ was to publicise the minutes of a meeting of the Communist Party’s Midland District Committee, minutes which, according to then BL chief executive Michael Edwardes, made it ‘absolutely clear that the intention [of the joint committee of the Communist Party and BL shop stewards] was to break the company’ (quoted in the 2002 BBC documentary series, ‘True Spies’ – transcript here). This information was bound to concern those members of the trade union who wished to pursue a less radical line in negotiations with British Leyland. The minutes of the meeting (again, according to the True Spies documentary) were obtained by an MI5 agent working within the Communist Party and the AUEW (Andrew's book confirms that the Security Service ‘obtained a copy’ of these minutes, but does not explicitly refer to the existence of an MI5 agent within either the Communist Party or the AUEW), and from there came into the possession of John Deverell's unit in the Cabinet Office. Andrew explains what happened next:

…at a meeting with Thatcher and Whitelaw, Deverell obtained their approval for [the record of the meeting] to be passed to the BL chairman, Sir Michael Edwardes. To disguise the source of the minutes, they were placed inside a brown envelope with a Birmingham postmark. Edwardes showed them to the president of the AUEW, Terry Duffy, who was sufficiently impressed to postpone strike action. Edwardes also contacted the Sunday Times, whose journalists tracked down some of those mentioned in the minutes. [p.672] 

This secret information, leaked by Deverell, helped to lead to a collapse in support for strike action both among the union leadership and the union members, thanks in part to press reporting of the affair. 

With all this in mind we can now return to our newly uploaded documents with a much better sense of what they show us. The final defeat of the call to strike action in support of Derek Robinson had occurred in February 1980 (see here). Our documents, concerning the NUM, are dated March 1980. It would therefore appear that our documents indicate a desire on the part of MT for Deverell to initiate another ‘ploy’ (possibly using similar tactics), this time directed against the NUM. This new idea for a ploy comes hot on the heels of the one that was successful at BL, and, like the BL ploy, apparently depends upon secret information passed to the government from a ‘source’ (or sources) whose position would have been ‘endangered’ by clumsy handling of the information.

In the case of the proposed NUM ploy, however, there was little prospect of success. In his reply to Whitmore, Armstrong notes that ‘the material which [Deverell] has immediately available and for which there is overt collateral would not be likely to cause Communist Party activists within the National Miners Left Club much embarrassment’. Instead, Armstrong suggests that 'with the coalmining scene relatively quiet at the moment, it would make sense to keep our powder dry, and our sources of information open, until a time when they could prove particularly useful’.

As we all know, the 'coalmining scene' didn't stay 'relatively quiet' for long. So did the government ever make use of these ‘sources of information’? It’s impossible to say from the documents that we currently have, and perhaps we will never know. Nevertheless, we will keep our eyes peeled for further evidence as more documents are released by The National Archives over the coming years.

Matt Hasler, Deputy Editor

A look into the archive: The Falklands Crisis - 5th May 1982

Here at the Margaret Thatcher Foundation we are in the process of adding to our already extensive archive of documents relating to the Falklands Crisis. We have just published one such document: a memo sent to President Reagan by one of his National Security advisers, dated 5th May 1982 and concerning the US-led attempt to secure a ceasefire between Britain and Argentina. This blogpost is an attempt to set the memo in context.

The 5th May 1982 was a crucial day in the diplomatic battle for the Falkland Islands. Three days previously the Argentine cruiser ARA General Belgrano had been sunk by a British nuclear-powered submarine, while on the 4th of May an Exocet fired by an Argentine jet had hit HMS Sheffield, crippling the ship. With both sides suffering significant casualties, calls for the cessation of hostilities were louder than ever before. Writing in her autobiography, MT commented that 'the shocking loss of life' as a result of the sinking of the Belgrano 'provided a reason - or in some cases perhaps an excuse - for breaks in the ranks among the less committed of our allies' (The Downing Street Years, pp. 215-16). The German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt described himself as "very dismayed" by events in the South Atlantic, while the Irish Government issued a statement declaring its intention to pursue a ceasefire resolution at the UN. It was within this context that US Secretary of State Al Haig was desperately seeking to broker a peace deal between Britain and Argentina.

Events came to a head on the 5th of May. In a telegram sent at just after 2am UK time, President Reagan commended to MT a six point list of proposals which collectively called for an immediate ceasefire and the joint withdrawal of British and Argentine forces, as well as acknowledging 'the existence of differing and conflicting views regarding the status of the Falkland Islands'. With UK agreement, the six point list would be forwarded to the Peruvians, who would in turn communicate them to the Argentine junta. In his démarche to MT Reagan acknowledges that the US proposals fall short of 'the ideas [previously] sent to Al [Haig] by your Foreign Secretary [Francis Pym]', but argues that these ideas would not have provided a 'basis for a peaceful settlement'. Pym's "ideas" crucially included a reference to the restoration of British Administration of the Falkland Islands and a statement to the effect that the wishes of the Islanders needed to be respected (i.e. a right to self-determination). Such language being unacceptable to both the Peruvians and the Argentines, Reagan argued that the the significantly weaker US peace proposal was 'now our best hope' for a peace settlement.

MT and Al Haig in Washington, 28th June 1982 - Wikimedia Commons

At about the same time as Reagan sent his telegram, the UK Ambassador to Washington, Nicholas Henderson, was meeting with Al Haig to discuss the proposals. Haig sought to impress upon Henderson the same points as Reagan had upon MT, namely, that the US peace proposals at this point represented the only chance for a peace settlement, and that any attempt by the British to insist on any of Pym's "ideas" would lead to their immediate rejection by the Argentines. Henderson's telegram to London, reporting on his meeting with Haig, concludes with 'a final word about the mood here':

Haig is fearful of the consequences of a prolongation of the fighting, particularly if it can be represented, however unfairly, that HMG has not pursued every possible chance of a settlement. He foresees that we may increasingly come to the USA for support and that if opinion turns to believing that we have missed the opportunity of peace, it is going to be difficult for the USA to stay in the supportive position they have now adopted.

A dilemma now faced the British Government. By rejecting the US proposals the British would risk presenting themselves as the aggressors in the fight, and this would be especially damaging following the sinking of the Belgrano and the weakening of support for the British position that it had brought about. But accepting the settlement would give rise to the possibility that the Argentine government might actually agree to go along with the US plan, thereby bringing an end to the conflict on terms that were objectionable to the British government - and to MT in particular.

The War Cabinet met at 9am on the morning of the 5th to discuss the US proposals. Pym argued that it 'would be highly damaging to reject Mr Haig's proposal, given the level of fighting which had now developed in the South Atlantic and the shifting attitudes of Britain's European partners', while MT emphasised her concerns about 'the position in relation to South Georgia', the 'ambiguous provision about the local administration of the Falklands', and the 'lack of any reference to the wishes of the inhabitants or to self-determination'. A full meeting of the Cabinet followed at 11:45am, where Haig's proposals were discussed in further detail. Once again Pym argued that they should be accepted, and Cabinet agreed, pending comparatively minor amendments. In particular, since the Argentines would not accept a commitment to self-determination within the terms of the peace settlement, a weaker amendment was proposed: the suggestion that 'the interim administration [of the Falklands] must at least consult with the locally elected representatives' (see here). The minute of the Cabinet meeting concludes with MT's summing up, and portrays her as reluctantly agreeing to the peace proposals. Whether or not Argentina accepted the proposals, she said, 'the United Kingdom would be seen to have pursued in the most responsible way every chance of ending the fighting and securing an agreement'.

In her autobiography MT describes herself as having been 'deeply unhappy about the US/Peruvian proposals' (The Downing Street Years, p.217). She notes that she 'drafted a personal letter to President Reagan that revealed perhaps too much of my frustration, though I toned it down before it was sent' (Ibid.). We have both the original and the "toned down" versions of her letter to Reagan in our archive. The original version is a particularly remarkable document for it reads almost as an argument against the very peace proposals that her Government had just accepted. In the view of Chris Collins, our general Editor, the fact that MT wrote this letter suggests that 'if only for a brief time, she had effectively lost control of the diplomacy to Pym' (see here). MT begins the letter by noting that Pym is writing to Haig in reply to the US proposals, but states that she is writing directly to Reagan because 'I think you are the only person who will understand the significance of what I am trying to say'. This formulation suggests a level of frustration with both Haig and Pym, and perhaps indicates a feeling that they are operating according to an agenda that is different from her own. She then goes on to argue that the US proposals are not faithful to the 'basic principles we must protect', 'first the right to self-determination and second that aggression must not pay'. The failure of the US proposals to uphold these principles implies for MT their abandonment: 'our principles are no longer what we believe, nor those we were elected to save, but what the dictator will accept'. Moreover, by accepting a peace settlement on the proposed terms the 'military junta will be able to proclaim that through invasion, they have succeeded in ousting the British Administration, with all that that means, have subjugated the right to self-determination, and have gained a negotiating framework which...is likely to lead to substantially increased Argentine powers...And what then is to stop another invasion to achieve the rest?' For MT, a ceasefire on these terms would constitute a British defeat in all but name.
 
The "toned down" version of the letter, eventually sent to Reagan at 8:30pm GMT that evening, is strongly-worded but significantly less inflammatory. In particular, although MT emphasises her concern to uphold 'the basic principles we must protect', she does not directly accuse the US Administration of abandoning them, and instead expresses the worry that 'the present rulers of the Argentine will not respect those principles'. The focus of criticism is therefore subtly shifted from the US Administration to the Argentine government.

Our newly published document now fills in the next piece of the puzzle. It is a memo from Bill Clark (a US National Security Adviser) to Reagan, reporting on the British response to the peace proposals. Although the document lacks a timestamp, it appears that it was passed to Reagan shortly after MT dispatched her "toned down" letter to Washington. It begins:

Attached is Prime Minister Thatcher's reply to your compromise proposal to achieve a ceasefire and negotiations for the resolution of the Falklands dispute. In a word, Maggie accepts the proposal.

Following a meeting between Haig and Henderson to discuss minor amendments, Haig sent the proposals on to the Peruvians. In his memo to Reagan Clark comments on the chances of Argentine agreement:

The Argentine response is uncertain. They see Thatcher's position eroding somewhat at home. They also see some opportunity for grandstanding among their third world brothers at the UN. Still they have fewer illusions about the ultimate military outcome.

In a telegram sent to London at 10:50pm GMT, Henderson anticipated that the Argentines would indeed go in for 'grandstanding' at the UN rather than accept the proffer of peace. Henderson was proved correct by the next day's news: 'As anticipated the proposals [have] been turned down by Galtieri...The Argentines [are] now moving to the UN and that [is] the end of that' (Pym telegram to Henderson, 6th May 1982, 1545 GMT).

So ended one of the most important diplomatic battles of the Falklands War. Yet there is a definite sense that the British government, and MT in particular, had managed something of a lucky escape. She writes in her memoirs that despite having to agree to the US proposals she 'took comfort from the fact that I never believed that the Argentine Junta would be prepared to withdraw on these or any other terms' (The Downing Street Years, p.217). Nevertheless, it must have been a significant relief for her to learn that Galtieri had rejected them. As her unsent letter to Reagan shows, she would have considered any other outcome to constitute a defeat, both for Britain and for her personally.

Matt Hasler, Deputy Editor