The 5th May 1982 was a crucial day in the diplomatic battle for the Falkland Islands. Three days previously the Argentine cruiser ARA General Belgrano had been sunk by a British nuclear-powered submarine, while on the 4th of May an Exocet fired by an Argentine jet had hit HMS Sheffield, crippling the ship. With both sides suffering significant casualties, calls for the cessation of hostilities were louder than ever before. Writing in her autobiography, MT commented that 'the shocking loss of life' as a result of the sinking of the Belgrano 'provided a reason - or in some cases perhaps an excuse - for breaks in the ranks among the less committed of our allies' (The Downing Street Years, pp. 215-16). The German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt described himself as "very dismayed" by events in the South Atlantic, while the Irish Government issued a statement declaring its intention to pursue a ceasefire resolution at the UN. It was within this context that US Secretary of State Al Haig was desperately seeking to broker a peace deal between Britain and Argentina.
Events came to a head on the 5th of May. In a telegram sent at just after 2am UK time, President Reagan commended to MT a six point list of proposals which collectively called for an immediate ceasefire and the joint withdrawal of British and Argentine forces, as well as acknowledging 'the existence of differing and conflicting views regarding the status of the Falkland Islands'. With UK agreement, the six point list would be forwarded to the Peruvians, who would in turn communicate them to the Argentine junta. In his démarche to MT Reagan acknowledges that the US proposals fall short of 'the ideas [previously] sent to Al [Haig] by your Foreign Secretary [Francis Pym]', but argues that these ideas would not have provided a 'basis for a peaceful settlement'. Pym's "ideas" crucially included a reference to the restoration of British Administration of the Falkland Islands and a statement to the effect that the wishes of the Islanders needed to be respected (i.e. a right to self-determination). Such language being unacceptable to both the Peruvians and the Argentines, Reagan argued that the the significantly weaker US peace proposal was 'now our best hope' for a peace settlement.
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| MT and Al Haig in Washington, 28th June 1982 - Wikimedia Commons |
Haig is fearful of the consequences of a prolongation of the fighting, particularly if it can be represented, however unfairly, that HMG has not pursued every possible chance of a settlement. He foresees that we may increasingly come to the USA for support and that if opinion turns to believing that we have missed the opportunity of peace, it is going to be difficult for the USA to stay in the supportive position they have now adopted.
A dilemma now faced the British Government. By rejecting the US proposals the British would risk presenting themselves as the aggressors in the fight, and this would be especially damaging following the sinking of the Belgrano and the weakening of support for the British position that it had brought about. But accepting the settlement would give rise to the possibility that the Argentine government might actually agree to go along with the US plan, thereby bringing an end to the conflict on terms that were objectionable to the British government - and to MT in particular.
The War Cabinet met at 9am on the morning of the 5th to discuss the US proposals. Pym argued that it 'would be highly damaging to reject Mr Haig's proposal, given the level of fighting which had now developed in the South Atlantic and the shifting attitudes of Britain's European partners', while MT emphasised her concerns about 'the position in relation to South Georgia', the 'ambiguous provision about the local administration of the Falklands', and the 'lack of any reference to the wishes of the inhabitants or to self-determination'. A full meeting of the Cabinet followed at 11:45am, where Haig's proposals were discussed in further detail. Once again Pym argued that they should be accepted, and Cabinet agreed, pending comparatively minor amendments. In particular, since the Argentines would not accept a commitment to self-determination within the terms of the peace settlement, a weaker amendment was proposed: the suggestion that 'the interim administration [of the Falklands] must at least consult with the locally elected representatives' (see here). The minute of the Cabinet meeting concludes with MT's summing up, and portrays her as reluctantly agreeing to the peace proposals. Whether or not Argentina accepted the proposals, she said, 'the United Kingdom would be seen to have pursued in the most responsible way every chance of ending the fighting and securing an agreement'.
In her autobiography MT describes herself as having been 'deeply unhappy about the US/Peruvian proposals' (The Downing Street Years, p.217). She notes that she 'drafted a personal letter to President Reagan that revealed perhaps too much of my frustration, though I toned it down before it was sent' (Ibid.). We have both the original and the "toned down" versions of her letter to Reagan in our archive. The original version is a particularly remarkable document for it reads almost as an argument against the very peace proposals that her Government had just accepted. In the view of Chris Collins, our general Editor, the fact that MT wrote this letter suggests that 'if only for a brief time, she had effectively lost control of the diplomacy to Pym' (see here). MT begins the letter by noting that Pym is writing to Haig in reply to the US proposals, but states that she is writing directly to Reagan because 'I think you are the only person who will understand the significance of what I am trying to say'. This formulation suggests a level of frustration with both Haig and Pym, and perhaps indicates a feeling that they are operating according to an agenda that is different from her own. She then goes on to argue that the US proposals are not faithful to the 'basic principles we must protect', 'first the right to self-determination and second that aggression must not pay'. The failure of the US proposals to uphold these principles implies for MT their abandonment: 'our principles are no longer what we believe, nor those we were elected to save, but what the dictator will accept'. Moreover, by accepting a peace settlement on the proposed terms the 'military junta will be able to proclaim that through invasion, they have succeeded in ousting the British Administration, with all that that means, have subjugated the right to self-determination, and have gained a negotiating framework which...is likely to lead to substantially increased Argentine powers...And what then is to stop another invasion to achieve the rest?' For MT, a ceasefire on these terms would constitute a British defeat in all but name.
The "toned down" version of the letter, eventually sent to Reagan at 8:30pm GMT that evening, is strongly-worded but significantly less inflammatory. In particular, although MT emphasises her concern to uphold 'the basic principles we must protect', she does not directly accuse the US Administration of abandoning them, and instead expresses the worry that 'the present rulers of the Argentine will not respect those principles'. The focus of criticism is therefore subtly shifted from the US Administration to the Argentine government.
Our newly published document now fills in the next piece of the puzzle. It is a memo from Bill Clark (a US National Security Adviser) to Reagan, reporting on the British response to the peace proposals. Although the document lacks a timestamp, it appears that it was passed to Reagan shortly after MT dispatched her "toned down" letter to Washington. It begins:
So ended one of the most important diplomatic battles of the Falklands War. Yet there is a definite sense that the British government, and MT in particular, had managed something of a lucky escape. She writes in her memoirs that despite having to agree to the US proposals she 'took comfort from the fact that I never believed that the Argentine Junta would be prepared to withdraw on these or any other terms' (The Downing Street Years, p.217). Nevertheless, it must have been a significant relief for her to learn that Galtieri had rejected them. As her unsent letter to Reagan shows, she would have considered any other outcome to constitute a defeat, both for Britain and for her personally.
Matt Hasler, Deputy Editor
The War Cabinet met at 9am on the morning of the 5th to discuss the US proposals. Pym argued that it 'would be highly damaging to reject Mr Haig's proposal, given the level of fighting which had now developed in the South Atlantic and the shifting attitudes of Britain's European partners', while MT emphasised her concerns about 'the position in relation to South Georgia', the 'ambiguous provision about the local administration of the Falklands', and the 'lack of any reference to the wishes of the inhabitants or to self-determination'. A full meeting of the Cabinet followed at 11:45am, where Haig's proposals were discussed in further detail. Once again Pym argued that they should be accepted, and Cabinet agreed, pending comparatively minor amendments. In particular, since the Argentines would not accept a commitment to self-determination within the terms of the peace settlement, a weaker amendment was proposed: the suggestion that 'the interim administration [of the Falklands] must at least consult with the locally elected representatives' (see here). The minute of the Cabinet meeting concludes with MT's summing up, and portrays her as reluctantly agreeing to the peace proposals. Whether or not Argentina accepted the proposals, she said, 'the United Kingdom would be seen to have pursued in the most responsible way every chance of ending the fighting and securing an agreement'.
In her autobiography MT describes herself as having been 'deeply unhappy about the US/Peruvian proposals' (The Downing Street Years, p.217). She notes that she 'drafted a personal letter to President Reagan that revealed perhaps too much of my frustration, though I toned it down before it was sent' (Ibid.). We have both the original and the "toned down" versions of her letter to Reagan in our archive. The original version is a particularly remarkable document for it reads almost as an argument against the very peace proposals that her Government had just accepted. In the view of Chris Collins, our general Editor, the fact that MT wrote this letter suggests that 'if only for a brief time, she had effectively lost control of the diplomacy to Pym' (see here). MT begins the letter by noting that Pym is writing to Haig in reply to the US proposals, but states that she is writing directly to Reagan because 'I think you are the only person who will understand the significance of what I am trying to say'. This formulation suggests a level of frustration with both Haig and Pym, and perhaps indicates a feeling that they are operating according to an agenda that is different from her own. She then goes on to argue that the US proposals are not faithful to the 'basic principles we must protect', 'first the right to self-determination and second that aggression must not pay'. The failure of the US proposals to uphold these principles implies for MT their abandonment: 'our principles are no longer what we believe, nor those we were elected to save, but what the dictator will accept'. Moreover, by accepting a peace settlement on the proposed terms the 'military junta will be able to proclaim that through invasion, they have succeeded in ousting the British Administration, with all that that means, have subjugated the right to self-determination, and have gained a negotiating framework which...is likely to lead to substantially increased Argentine powers...And what then is to stop another invasion to achieve the rest?' For MT, a ceasefire on these terms would constitute a British defeat in all but name.
The "toned down" version of the letter, eventually sent to Reagan at 8:30pm GMT that evening, is strongly-worded but significantly less inflammatory. In particular, although MT emphasises her concern to uphold 'the basic principles we must protect', she does not directly accuse the US Administration of abandoning them, and instead expresses the worry that 'the present rulers of the Argentine will not respect those principles'. The focus of criticism is therefore subtly shifted from the US Administration to the Argentine government.
Our newly published document now fills in the next piece of the puzzle. It is a memo from Bill Clark (a US National Security Adviser) to Reagan, reporting on the British response to the peace proposals. Although the document lacks a timestamp, it appears that it was passed to Reagan shortly after MT dispatched her "toned down" letter to Washington. It begins:
Attached is Prime Minister Thatcher's reply to your compromise proposal to achieve a ceasefire and negotiations for the resolution of the Falklands dispute. In a word, Maggie accepts the proposal.Following a meeting between Haig and Henderson to discuss minor amendments, Haig sent the proposals on to the Peruvians. In his memo to Reagan Clark comments on the chances of Argentine agreement:
The Argentine response is uncertain. They see Thatcher's position eroding somewhat at home. They also see some opportunity for grandstanding among their third world brothers at the UN. Still they have fewer illusions about the ultimate military outcome.In a telegram sent to London at 10:50pm GMT, Henderson anticipated that the Argentines would indeed go in for 'grandstanding' at the UN rather than accept the proffer of peace. Henderson was proved correct by the next day's news: 'As anticipated the proposals [have] been turned down by Galtieri...The Argentines [are] now moving to the UN and that [is] the end of that' (Pym telegram to Henderson, 6th May 1982, 1545 GMT).
So ended one of the most important diplomatic battles of the Falklands War. Yet there is a definite sense that the British government, and MT in particular, had managed something of a lucky escape. She writes in her memoirs that despite having to agree to the US proposals she 'took comfort from the fact that I never believed that the Argentine Junta would be prepared to withdraw on these or any other terms' (The Downing Street Years, p.217). Nevertheless, it must have been a significant relief for her to learn that Galtieri had rejected them. As her unsent letter to Reagan shows, she would have considered any other outcome to constitute a defeat, both for Britain and for her personally.
Matt Hasler, Deputy Editor
